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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann., §78-2-2(3)(k) (1953) as amended. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), the 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter, upon transfer by the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that 
Appellee was entitled to 25% ownership in a corporation owned by Appellant and 
Appellee, where there is undisputed evidence that Appellee had purchased only 14.5% 
ownership in the corporation, and the only evidence supporting the trial court's findings 
that Appellee is entitled to an additional 10.5% ownership is the existence of monies on 
the corporation's books that were owed to Appellee and the testimony of Appellee's wife 
that Appellant had taken unequal compensation. Conclusions of law are reviewed under a 
"correctness" standard. England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). This issue 
was preserved repeatedly during the trial of this action and during post trial proceedings. 
An illustrative example of appellant's preservation of this issue is found at pages 454-60 
of the Transcript. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Appellee's wife ("Mrs. Barney") to 
testify regarding the company's business records without being qualified as and 
accounting expert. Decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony is an 
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abuse-of-discretion standard. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 862 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1993). Appellant preserved this issue by objecting at pages 294-99 of the 
Transcript. 
3. Whether the trial court erred by receiving into evidence improper 
summaries compiled by Mrs. Bamey when the summaries consisted of improper hearsay 
evidence not compiled in the normal course of business. Decisions on the admissibility of 
evidence are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. State of Utah, v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). Appellant preserved this issue by objecting to the 
introduction of summaries at pages 294, 298-302, 307, 309-11, 313-14, 321, 323, and 
324-25 of the Transcript. 
4. Whether the Court erred by refusing to allow Siddoway to cross-examine 
Mrs. Bamey regarding her summaries of STI business records and by refusing to allow 
Siddoway to offer testimony to rebut Mrs. Barney's testimony and Summaries. Decisions 
to admit or exclude testimony is an abuse-of-discretion standard. Steffensen v. Smith fs 
Management Corporation, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). Appellant preserved this issue by 
pretrial motion to exclude Mrs. Barney's summaries on pages 4-7, 348, 352, 360, and 365 
and 458, of the Transcript. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
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sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of 
the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, 
consist of the witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions 
of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6). Hearsay Exceptions. (Records of 
Regularly Conducted Activity) 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006. Summaries. 
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which 
cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a 
chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made 
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a 
reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in 
court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Jon Siddoway, ("Siddoway") formed Standard Tile, Inc. ("STI") in 1986 
and, through 1989, owned either 99 or 100% of the stock of the corporation. Sometime 
prior to March of 1989, Siddoway approached Appellee, Lee O. Barney ("Barney") about 
joining Siddoway in working his current contracts and becoming a shareholder and 
partner in STL The parties discussed the terms and ultimately reached a verbal agreement 
concerning Barney's entry into STI sometime prior to March 31, 1989. 
Some terms and details of that verbal agreement are in dispute. However it is not 
disputed that STI agreed to pay Barney's pre-existing debts; that Barney would receive 
the same pay for tile setting work as Siddoway; that Siddowa> and Barney would each 
have the use of a company vehicle; that profits from STI would be paid in bonuses split 
75/25 between Siddoway and Bamey; and that Barney would have the option of 
purchasing up to 25% of STI with his bonus money at a rate of $1000.00 per 1% of the 
outstanding stock of STL 
Siddoway managed the business, including administration of all finances and 
accounts for both businesses. Corporate accounting was done through an independent 
accounting firm and CPA named Tubber Okuda. 
The parties had a falling out in February of 1996. In July of 1996 Bamey filed a 
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court seeking to recover unspecified damages 
allegedly owed to Bamey by Siddoway in connection with the parties' business 
relationships. The Complaint also sought an accounting and corporate dissolution. 
Siddoway filed a pre-trial motion in limine seeking to exclude newly-introduced 
damage summaries compiled by Barney's wife, Kristi Barney ("Mrs. BarneyM). The 
summaries were made available to Siddoway at the final pretrial conference, just days 
prior to trial, and after Mrs. Barney's deposition and the close of discovery. Thus 
Siddoway was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Bamey on the summaries 
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in deposition or any other discovery prior to trial. At trial, the court denied Siddoway's 
motion in limine. 
A three day bench trial was held February 17-19,1999. The trial was marred by 
constant interruptions, repeated instances of judicial examination of witnesses and 
preclusion of Siddoway's attempts to introduce evidence. The trial court took over 
examination of Siddoway and aggressively intimidated him with derisive comments about 
his character and his conduct of the business. 
During the trial, the court received into evidence Mrs. Barney's damage 
summaries, and then improperly limited Siddoway's cross examination of Mrs. Barney on 
those summaries. The court also precluded testimony by the company accountant (Mr. 
Okuda) relating to those summaries, and then precluded Siddoway's counsel from 
examining Siddoway with regard to the content of Mrs. Barney's summaries. 
The court ultimately drew upon Mrs. Barney's summaries to find that Barney had 
acquired 25 percent ownership of STI and that Barney was entitled to 50 percent of the 
assets taken from STI by Siddoway. 
Appellant raised objections to the court's proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, but the objections were overruled by the trial court which signed its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the Order and Judgment on June 7, 
1989. Appellants now appeal from the court's order and entry of final judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Evidence Bearing on the Court's Erroneous Finding that Mr. Barney 
Acquired 25% Ownership in Standard Tile, Inc. 
1. Mr. Siddoway testified that when Mr. Barney came to Standard Tile, the 
company paid off Mr. Barney's prior company debts which amounted to more than 
$8,000.00 but less than $12,000.00. (Transcript, p. 166). Those debts included material 
bills at Florida, Dowel Tile and Contempo as well as $1,200 or $2,000 in IRS taxes. 
(Transcript, p. 166). 
2. Mr. Siddoway testified to his understanding that Mr. Barney's prior debts 
were paid off without obligation for repayment by Mr. Barney -"it was a cost of doing 
business." (Transcript, p. 167). 
3. Mr. Barney testified that Standard Tile absorbed between $3,000.00 and 
$5,000.00 of Mr. Barney's prior debt, and that at the end of the first year Mr. Siddoway 
told him that he would have to pay back the debt before he could purchase stock with the 
remainder of his bonus. (Transcript, pp. 207-208). 
4. Mr. Siddoway testified that for purposes of motivating Mr. Barney to 
increased attention to the good of the company, (Transcript, p. 164) he and Mr. Barney 
entered an agreement that Mr. Barney could purchase up to 25% of Standard Tile by 
paying $l,000.00/share up to $25,000.00 (Transcript, p. 99), and that Mr. Barney did not 
try to negotiate a different price for the stock and that Mr. Barney agreed to a 25% 
maximum purchase. (Transcript, pp. 158-159). 
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5. Mr. Barney testified that he agreed with Mr. Siddoway that he had the 
option to purchase up to 25% of Standard Tile for $25,000.00 for $1000.00 per percent. 
(Transcript, p. 236). 
6. Mr. Okuda testified that he understood the agreement between Mr. 
Siddoway and Mr. Barney to be that Mr. Barney could buy up to 25% of Standard Tile at 
the rate of $l,000.00/share. (Transcript, pp. 424-425). 
7. Mr. Barney testified that near the end of the first year of his employment at 
Standard Tile, Mr. Siddoway told him that because the company had paid off Mr. 
Barney's debts, Mr. Barney would have to pay book value for company stock, with a 
company value of $100,000.00. (Transcript, pp. 201-202). 
8. Mr. Siddoway testified that Mr. Barney was told the terms and accepted 
them. (Transcript, pp. 167-168). Mr. Barney testified that he agreed to the purchase price 
of $25,000.00. (Transcript, p. 202). 
9. Mr. Siddoway testified that Mr. Barney made decisions with respect to 
when stock would be purchased. (Transcript, p. 481). Mr. Barney understood that the 
bonus money was his and he could use it to purchase stock or take the money. 
(Transcript, p. 484-85). On at least one occasion, Mr. Barney chose to apply his bonus to 
remodel work on his house. (Transcript, p. 481-82). 
10. Mr. Siddoway testified that Mr. Barney chose to apply three of his bonuses 
to stock purchases. There were other bonuses he received and chose not to apply them to 
stock purchase. (Transcript, p. 482). 
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11. Mr. Siddoway testified that Mr. Barney told Mr. Siddoway how he wanted 
his bonuses handled, whether he wanted to purchase stock or apply the bonus to other 
things. (Transcript, p. 484). This decision making process occurred each time a bonus 
was declared. (Transcript, p. 485). 
12. Mr. Barney testified that bonus checks were written out by Mr. Siddoway 
and handed to him with all the ffinformationM on them and that he would then sign the 
check back over to Mr. Siddoway, without discussion. (Transcript, p. 204). 
13. Mr. Barney testified that at the end of the second year he made his first 
stock purchase for approximately $6,000.00 (Transcript, p. 210), but he could not 
remember the date of his second stock purchase. (Transcript, p. 211). 
14. Mr. Okuda testified that Mr. Barney's first purchase of stock was 
November of 1990 when he paid a net total of $1,500.00 toward stock in Standard Tile. 
(Transcript, p. 416). Mr. Barney's second stock purchase occurred December of 1990 
when Mr. Barney was issued a bonus check of $10,000.00 from which he paid $7,000.00 
to purchase stock. (Transcript, p. 416). 
15. Mr. Okuda testified that Mr. Barney received a bonus for $10,000.00 in 
December of 1994 from which $3,900.00 was deducted for taxes, $6,000.00 for stock 
purchase and Mr. Barney received a check for the balance of $61.42. (Transcript, p. 420-
21). 
16. Mr. Okuda testified that both Mr. Barney and Mr. Siddoway consulted him 
in allocation of bonus money to stock purchases. (Transcript, p. 419). 
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17. Mr. Okuda testified that another bonus of $7,500.00 was issued to Mr. 
Barney in 1995 however, after taxes and accounts receivable were deducted, for an 
unknown reason, the balance of $5,370.00 was never distributed to Mr. Barney in a 
check. The money sits on the company books as a note payable to Mr. Barney for 
$5,370.00. (Transcript, p. 421-22). 143. 
18. Mr. Okuda Testified that loans to the company by either partner (such as 
bonuses left in the company) were classified in accounts 285 and 290. He further testified 
that loans or debits from the company accounts to Mr. Barney and Mr. Siddoway were 
tracked under account numbers 135 and 136. (Transcript, p. 427). 
B. Evidence Bearing on the Court's Erroneous Qualification of Kristi Barney as 
an Expert Accounting Witness. 
19. Kristi Barney testified that her only educational qualification to testify as an 
expert accountant was an associates degree in accounting from Mountain West Business 
College, which she received after attending school for a little more than a year. Her only 
work experience to qualify her as an expert was her work as a customer service agent for 
the United Parcel Service and as a book keeper for PFC, an equipment leasing firm. 
(Transcript, pp. 295-296). She also testified that she had worked for some accountants on 
a part-time basis doing tax returns. (Transcript, pp. 292). Most recently, she worked for 
three years for Larry H. Miller (auto businesses) as an office manager, where her duties 
included generating monthly financial statements. (Transcript, pp. 291-292). 
20. Kristi Barney testified that she had no experience in preparing damage 
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summaries for litigation and had never been qualified in a court of law to testify as an 
expert on matters of accounting. (Transcript, p. 296). 
21. Kristi Barney initially denied having been sued by her former employer 
PFC. Later, her counsel stipulated that she was in fact sued by her former employer, 
PFC. (Transcript, p. 297). 
22. The Court then heard Defendant's proffer of documentation and testimony 
that would show Kristi Barney was sued by her former employer PFC in a suit arising 
from her having taken money from the company and that she confessed to judgment for 
the money owed. (Transcript, pp. 297-298). 
C. Evidence Bearing on the Court's Erroneous Admission of Kristi Barney's 
Summaries of Excess Benefits, Including Exhibit 14. 
Evidence as to Whether the Summaries Were Summaries of Business Records. 
23. Kristi Barney testified that she prepared her summary of alleged personal 
benefits going to Mr. Siddoway based upon the bank statements, canceled checks, 
invoices, financial statements quarterly and annually, along with tax returns and 
depreciation schedules as well as information regarding real property which was 
subpoenaed from title companies. (Transcript, p. 293). 
24. Kristi Barney testified that she attempted to summarize excess benefits 
taken by Mr. Siddoway from Standard Tile on Plaintiffs Exhibit 14 by reviewing 
financial statements and actual copies of checks and any back up documentation provided 
with the checks, going year by year from 1990 through 1996, listing checks, dates, the 
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payee and the account code from the company general ledger. (Transcript, pp. 299-302). 
25. Kristi Barney testified that she did not review all the checks available in 
Standard Tile financial records in compiling her summary. (Transcript, pp. 302, 328). 
26. Kristi Barney testified that in preparing her summary of excess personal 
benefits to Mr. Siddoway, she only looked at things which looked like they were personal 
expenses of Mr. Siddoway. (Transcript, p. 302). 
27. Kristi Barney testified that 290 was a payable account, meaning that it was 
a liability to the company-a debt that the company must pay to Mr. Siddoway. She stated 
that there were many entries going back and forth, both debit and credit entries which 
became a little confusing. (Transcript, p. 315). 
28. Kristi Barney testified that there were many more journal entries than what 
she included in her summary. (Transcript, p. 316). 
29. Kristi Barney then testified to certain entries made which she had been 
unable to explain by supporting documentation, including: an entry showing that Mr. 
Siddoway loaned the company $4,500.00 (Transcript, p. 317); several other loans in the 
first four entries which represented loans from Mr. Siddoway to the company (Transcript, 
p. 318). 
30. Kristi Barney testified that her summary of unequal personal benefits was 
based upon her assumption that Mr. Barney should receive a commensurate, equal benefit 
in every respect from the corporation that Mr. Siddoway received. That assumption was 
based on what her husband had told her about the agreement. (Transcript, p. 336). 
11 
31. Kristi Barney testified that when she was unable to locate supporting 
documentation for a check which she listed as a personal benefit to Mr. Siddoway, she 
had no idea of the purpose of the check and would be speculating if asked to state a 
purpose for such a check. (Transcript, pp. 340-341). 
32. Kristi Barney testified that she had performed her calculations assuming a 
25/75% ownership relationship from the very beginning of the parties' relationship even 
though stock was not purchased by Mr. Barney until later. (Transcript, p. 340). 
33. Kristi Barney testified that she had looked for all checks that were paid for 
either partner, (Transcript, p. 342), and that she made a summary of Mr. Barney's notes 
payable and receivable from Standard Tile but did not include that summary in the Court 
summary. (Transcript, p. 342). 
34. Kristi Barney testified that she did not list checks in her summary which 
indicated a benefit to Mr. Barney.(Transcript, p. 342). 
Evidence as to Whether Kristi Barney Had any Probative Knowledge of the 
Contents of the Summaries. 
35. Kristi Barney testified that after reviewing the payroll records of officer's 
compensation she listed an excess of $13,489 in excess salary and bonuses to Mr. 
Siddoway. (Transcript, p. 378). But she admitted not knowing how much of alleged 
excess compensation of $13,489.00 she attributed to Mr. Siddoway might have been 
bonus money to which he was entitled as a 75% owner. (Transcript, pp. 378-379). 
36. Kristi Barney testified that she had questions about some entries that she 
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could find no explanation for-where she could see things went from one account to 
another but wasn't able to tell why. (Transcript, p. 315). 
37. Kristi Barney admitted that she had not way to verify whether or not an 
electronic key pad installed on Mr. Siddoway 's home garage was for purposes of 
allowing employees access to the garage to pick up job materials stored there. (Transcript, 
p. 342). 
38. Kristi Barney testified that she was not aware that money paid to The Sports 
Club was for fishing supplies attendant to a company promotional fishing trip for 
employees, customers and potential customers. (Transcript, p. 344). 
39. Kristi Barney admitted that she did not know from personal knowledge that 
Mr. Siddoway had sold Jazz tickets and did not know what year it might have happened 
and did not know for what price the tickets were allegedly sold. (Transcript, pp. 354-355). 
40. Kristi Barney admitted a lack of knowledge as to the actual make, model, 
year or use of the fax machine or other office equipment she had estimated and attributed 
as a personal benefit to Mr. Siddoway. (Transcript, pp. 365-367). 
41. Kristi Barney testified that with regards to her summary listed as Plaintiffs 
exhibit 20, her review of the company records did not permit her to determine what was 
or was not a justifiable expense. (Transcript, p. 397). 
Evidence As to Whether the Summaries Improperly Selected Only Information 
From Business Records That Disclosed Mr. Siddoway's Transactions and Disregarded 
Mr. Barney's Transactions. 
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42. Kristi Barney admitted that Standard Tile paid for a fireplace insert in her 
home but did not include the transaction in any Summary. (Transcript, p. 342). 
43. Kristi Barney admitted that Standard Tile paid for stucco and electrical 
work on the Barney's residence, and for remodeling work to create a home office and 
bedroom in the garage, but that she did not attempt to calculate the value of those 
improvements for purposes of her summaries of benefits to Mr. Siddoway. (Transcript, p. 
343). 
44. Kristi Barney admitted that Standard Tile paid for and maintained her 
husband's truck while he was employed there but that she did not attempt to calculate the 
value of that benefit in her summary to the Court. (Transcript, p. 344). 
45. Kristi Barney admitted that she included a check for $4,950.00 to Pacific 
Charters as a personal benefit to Mr. Siddoway even though she knew about the 
company's promotional fishing trip which her husband, Mr. Barney, went on. (Transcript, 
p. 345). 
46. Kristi Barney admitted that she and her husband attended Jazz games using 
company Jazz tickets (Transcript, p. 353) and admitted that the basis of her assigning the 
value of the company Jazz tickets to Mr. Siddoway was that he attended the games when 
she and her husband attended. (Transcript, p. 354). 
47. Kristi Barney admitted that her husband had dental work done at the 
company's expense via a trade with the Dentist, but did not include the value of the trade 
on the Summary. (Transcript, p. 357). 
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48. With regard to Jazz tickets owned by Standard Tile, Mr. Siddoway testified 
that Mr. Barney as well as everyone else in the company was given a chance to use them. 
(Transcript, p. 148). 
Evidence That the Company Followed Appropriate Accounting Practices and that 
Kristi Barney's Opinion of Excess Benefits is Unsupported by the Summaries. 
49. Mr. Siddoway testified that he was in charge of signing checks on Standard 
Tile's checking account. (Transcript, p. 137). 
50. Mr. Siddoway testified that he supplied the accountant with a computer 
printout indicating the category for each check drafted-and when the accountant had 
questions he called Mr. Siddoway and the accountant would then make appropriate 
changes to assigned categories. (Transcript, p. 138). 
51. Mr. Siddoway testified that he performed all administrative chores, 
including the bidding, (except occasional bidding by Mr. Bamey) all the paperwork, all 
book work, all ordering of materials, "from six in the morning to eight.. .and then from 
four or five at night until sometimes midnighf'-working substantially more than 40 hours 
a week. (Transcript, p. 163). 
52. Mr. Okuda testified that Mr. Siddoway had maintained company records 
effectively and properly. (Transcript, p. 411). 
53. Mr. Okuda testified that when his review of Mr. Siddoway's accounting left 
him with a question regarding the proper classification of any given expense or draft on 
Standard Tile accounts he called Mr. Siddoway and then made a decision as to the proper 
IS 
classification based on Mr. Siddoway's explanation of the purchase. (Transcript, pp. 411-
412). 
54. Mr. Okuda testified that Standard Tile's record keeping and accounting 
were performed in the usual manner-typical of such companies. (Transcript, pp. 409-
411). 
55. Mr. Okuda testified that he had reviewed all drafts on Standard Tile 
accounts submitted by Mr. Siddoway and that he had found that expenses and benefits 
taken by the partners were properly accounted for and drafts were appropriately 
categorized such that Mr. Okuda had no reason for concern as to the legitimacy of any 
transaction. (Transcript, pp. 411-412). 
56. Mr. Okuda further testified that payouts from Standard Tile appeared 
proper. (Transcript, p. 412). 
57. Mr. Okuda explained that on occasion, both partners took advances from 
the company in anticipation of bonuses at year's end, and so for accounting purposes, 
account no. 135, representing loans to Mr. Siddoway; and account no. 136 representing 
loans to Mr. Barney; were set up and the advances were referred to as "notes receivable" 
to the company (Transcript, p. 420). 
58. With regard to the Jazz tickets purchase by the company, Mr. Siddoway 
testified that Standard Tile had purchased Jazz tickets for approximately 15 years and that 
the Jazz tickets were primarily used for business development, advertising and 
employees. (Transcript, p. 192). 
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59. Mr. Siddoway testified that his job was advertising and business 
development, and that when he used the Jazz tickets, he took potential new business or 
on-going clients and that it was a very successful method of developing business. 
(Transcript, pp. 192-193). 
60. Mr. Siddoway testified that as president of the company, he made the 
decision as to how the tickets would be used, including giving them to employees (Mr. 
Barney included) on certain occasions. (Transcript, p. 193). 
61. With regard to proper categorization of drafts on Mr. Siddoway's company 
accounting, Mr. Okuda testified as an example that a payment to South Jordan City had 
been determined by he and Mr. Siddoway to be personal in nature and so it was listed as 
an account receivable or loan by the company. (Transcript, p. 432). 
62. Mr. Okuda testified that the corporation had been treated fairly in all 
respects and that there was no hidden or manipulated money. (Transcript, p. 433). 
63. With regard to proper categorization of drafts on company accounts, Mr. 
Okuda testified that charges incident to a vacation Mr. Siddoway had taken had been 
properly classified as personal. (Transcript, p. 434). 
64. Mr. Okuda testified that loans to the company or to partners were normal in 
a construction company like Standard Tile. (Transcript, p. 436). 
65. Mr. Okuda explained that journal notes of "officer compensation" 
represented bonuses paid to both partners. (Transcript p. 438). 
66. Mr. Okuda explained that the amount questioned by Kristi Barney 
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($71,816.40) on her summaries was actually a calculation of wages due to Mr. Siddoway 
for extra work in the company, but the money had never been paid because the company 
did not have the money to pay it. Ultimately the amount had been written off. (Transcript, 
p. 439). 
67. Mr. Okuda, testified that Mrs. Siddoway's relationship to the company was 
not unusual, that she performed many services for the company such as making deliveries 
to the accountants, keeping some books and records and running a lot of errands but that 
she was not compensated on payroll for any services she rendered to Standard Tile or 
S&B. (Transcript, p. 440). 
68. Mr. Okuda testified that he had determined that there were no improper 
benefits to either party. (Transcript, p.442). 
69. Mr. Okuda testified that he had reviewed Kristi Barney's summary of 
"excess compensation" transactions with regard to Mr. Siddoway and that the entries she 
had selected as improper were actually proper business transactions and could be 
explained. (Transcript, p. 437). 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
The trial court erroneously concluded that Barney was entitled to 25% ownership 
in STL This conclusion was based upon a prior erroneous conclusion, unsupported in the 
record, that a declared and unpaid bonus could be converted to a stock purchase payment 
and that uncalculated and unspecified "excessive compensfition" to Siddoway could be 
converted to stock purchase payments for Barney in the amount necessary to bring 
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Barney's stock ownership to 25%. 
The testimony established that Barney and Siddoway agreed that Barney could 
purchase up to 25% of the stock of STI at the rate of $1,000 per 1% of stock. Barney paid 
$14,500 toward stock purchase. The trial court is not empowered to redefine the terms 
and status of agreements between the parties. By redefining bonuses and "excessive 
compensation" as stock purchases, the court improperly intervened in the parties' 
contract. 
Had the trial court applied the law correctly, it would have concluded that Barney 
was entitled to 14.5% of the ownership of STI and applied that percentage to the 
distribution of STI's assets, arriving at a total judgment of $25,584.66. 
The trial court erred in qualifying Mrs. Barney as an expert accounting witness 
because (1) she was not qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
to provide scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge to the court. Mrs. Barney 
had no professional certification and no experience or training to provide forensic or 
investigative accounting testimony and opinion 
The trial court erred in receiving "summaries" prepared by Mrs. Barney where the 
evidence conclusively demonstrated that the summaries could not satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 1006, U.R.E. and were based on speculation and conjecture. Mrs. Barney 
testified that she improperly selected only certain documents and limited information to 
include in her summaries, ignoring other records and thus misleading the court. The trial 
court compounded the error by relying directly on inadmissible summaries to determine 
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the amount of ownership to be awarded Barney and to calculate the amount of the 
judgment. Furthermore, Mrs. Barney had no knowledge of the content of many of the 
documents she purported to summarize and could not explain the nature of the 
transactions upon which she was opining. 
The trial court erred repeatedly in admitting evidence over appellant's objections, 
and compounded the gravity of the error by improperly refusing to permit appellant to 
cross examine or introduce evidence to rebut the improperly admitted evidence. 
This Court should reform the judgment and reduce Barney's ownership to 14.5% 
in accordance with the law and evidence. This Court should properly apply such 
percentage of ownership to the assets of STI and reform the judgment and reduce 
Barney's award to $25,584.66. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BARNEY 
WAS A 25% SHAREHOLDER IN STI AND ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED 
THAT PERCENTAGE TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN ASSETS. 
Based on its findings, the trial court erroneously concluded, as a matter of law, that 
"Barney was a 25 percent owner in the corporation STI." (Conclusions no. 1) and applied 
that percentage of ownership to certain assets of the corporation in order to distribute the 
value of the assets to the owners. On appeal, conclusions of law by the trial court are 
reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (FN3) (Utah 
1991). As stated in Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989), "this Court accords 
no deference to the legal decision of the trial court." 
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At trial, it was undisputed that Barney had the right to purchase up to 25% of STI 
for a purchase price of $1,000 per percentage point. (Transcript, pp. 236, 158-159; see 
also Finding no. 14.) It is also undisputed that in order to purchase stock, Barney 
designated amounts from his periodic bonuses to be applied to stock purchases. 
(Transcript, pp. 204, 483-484.) Finally, it was undisputed that "Barney paid $14,500 out 
of his bonuses toward purchase of stock . . . . " (Finding no. 15.) Neither party presented 
any evidence showing Barney purchased more than $14,500 in stock. The evidence 
showed that Barney was required (in every purchase) to affirmatively assign money to 
stock purchases. (Transcript, pp.203-204, 483-484, 419). The facts also show that more 
often than not, he chose to use his bonus money elsewhere. Company records showed that 
in the five years between 1989 and 1996, Barney only applied bonus money to stock 
purchases three times; twice in 1989 and once in 1994. (Transcript, pp. 416-421). 
In order to boost Barney's ownership percentage to 25%, the trial court found, 
without any basis in fact or law, that a bonus belonging to Barney that had not been paid 
out and had not been designated or assigned by Barney to purchase stock, "should be 
applied toward the stock purchase bringing the total stock purchase to $19,870 or a total 
of 19.87 percent of the stock." (Findings no. 16.) Then, again, without any basis in fact 
or law, the trial court found that "excess benefits taken by Siddoway" should also be 
considered a stock purchase by Barney and he "is therefore a 25 percent shareholder in 
STI." (Findings no. 19.) No basis existed for the trial court's creation of an additional 
10.5% ownership by Barney in STI. 
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A court cannot redefine the terms and the status of an agreement between two 
parties. Persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms 
without intervention of the court to raise the parties above the effects of their own bargain 
or to rewrite a contract to supply terms omitted by the parties. Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). By redefining an account payable to 
Barney as a stock purchase and assigning alleged unequal benefits taken by Siddoway to 
additional purchases of stock. In essence, the court intervened in the parties' contract and 
placed Barney in a more favorable position than he placed himself. 
The trial court erroneously applied a multiplier of 25% to the value of certain 
assets of STI in making its findings as to the amount of damages in this case. In Findings 
of Fact 24 and 25, the trial court calculates the value of certain real property assets at 
$110,549.26 and awards Barney judgment in the amount of $27,598.57, or 25% of the 
total value of the assets. Similarly, the trial court awards Barney 25% of the value of the 
company's equipment. By erroneously adding 10.5% onto Barney's ownership, the trial 
court improperly inflated the percentage of STI assets payable to Barney. In a proper 
calculation, the trial court should have found that Barney was entitled to 14.5% of 
$110,549.26, or $16,029.64. 
The trial court made additional errors in awarding Barney a share of the assets of 
the corporation. As set forth in Finding no. 32, the court concluded that an account 
receivable which STI carried from Siddoway in the amount of $13,415.63. It is clear 
from the records of the corporation that the foregoing amount was carried on the books as 
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a note receivable from Siddoway, an asset of the company. Mrs. Barney also recognized 
that notes receivable from owners to the company were and should be treated as assets of 
the corporation. (Transcript, pp. 330-31.) However, the court, rather than applying a 
correct percentage of ownership to determine Barney's entitlement, applied a 50% figure 
as though the debt was excessive compensation. The court's erroneous application of this 
account receivable constitutes an error of law. Barney should be awarded 14.5% of the 
account receivable in the amount of $1,945.26. 
The trial court applied a multiplier of 25% to the value of certain^assets of STI in 
making its findings as to the amount of damages in this case. In Findings 24 and 25, the 
trial court calculates the value of certain real property assets at $110,549.26 and awards 
Barney judgment in the amount of $27,598.57, or 25% of the total value of the assets. 
Similarly, the trial court awards Barney 25% of the value of the company's equipment. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUALIFYING KRISTI BARNEY AS AN 
EXPERT TO TESTIFY AS TO FORENSIC AND CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTING. 
The trial court erroneously qualified Mrs. Barney as an expert accounting witness 
and permitted her to testify as to her forensic accounting of the financial records of STI. 
Mrs. Barney was permitted to testify that she had made an analysis of the records of the 
company and give her opinion that the records established Siddoway had received 
excessive benefits from the company. However, Mrs. Barney was not qualified by 
education, training, experience or any other permissible basis to give opinion testimony 
on the matters offered. In the absence of adequate expert qualifications, Mrs. Barney's 
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testimony, both in verbal and written form, constitutes inadmissible hearsay, speculation, 
conjecture and opinion. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. Rule 702 
states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
The trial court has the primary responsibility for determining whether a particular witness 
qualifies as an expert. Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). An 
appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to accept or exclude expert testimony 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1993). 
At the beginning of Mrs. Barney's testimony, Appellants objected to her proffered 
qualification as an expert and to her introduction of improper "summaries" containing 
subjective conclusions and opinion concerning the records of the corporation. The court 
overruled appellants' objections. (Transcript, pp. 294-299). Notably, the court received 
the summaries as "illustrative of her testimony" indicating that appellants' objections go 
to the weight given the summaries, and specifically indicated appellants would be 
permitted to cross examine on the summaries. (Transcript, p. 298). Appellants also 
objected to the summaries based upon surprise and inability to question the witness 
during discovery concerning the summaries. The trial court overruled this objection as 
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well. (Transcript, pp. 301-02). 
Here, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in allowing Mrs. Barney to offer 
"expert'1 accounting testimony regarding allegedly improper benefits and compensation 
received by Siddoway. The nature of the expert testimony provided by Mrs. Barney was 
forensic and investigative in nature. She did not merely compile a summary of the 
records and testify descriptively of what the records contained; rather, she examined the 
financial books and records of corporation as an (unqualified) forensic or investigative 
auditor and drew conclusions about what the records meant, when the meaning of the 
records was not apparent on the face of the records. She offered into evidence a damage 
summary, containing subjective and Mexpert'1 analysis on what transactions constituted 
improper receipt of excessive personal benefits by Siddoway - as opposed to legitimate 
corporate expenses, charges or purchases. This type of accounting exercise requires a 
specialized training and education in the fields of forensic analysis, investigative auditing, 
and business tax knowledge. 
However, as Mrs. Barney testified, she is not even a Certified Public Accountant, 
let alone a forensic or investigative auditor or tax accountant. She had never previously 
been qualified by a court of law as an accounting expert and had never provided damage 
summaries in litigation. Mrs. Barney's relevant education consists of an Associate 
Degree in accounting from Mountain West Business College in 1987 which took 
approximately a year to earn. (Transcript, pp. 295 -296). Her "accounting experience" 
consists of working part time with several accountants doing accounting and tax returns 
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(Transcript, p. 292), and a three year stint as an office manager who generated monthly 
financial statements. She testified to other "qualifying" work as a temporary United 
Parcel Service customer service agent. (Transcript, pp. 291-292). 
Mrs. Barney also worked at "PFC" for approximately two years performing 
accounting activities (Transcript, p. 292). Significantly, Mrs. Barney was sued by PFC 
for wrongfully taking money from the company and failing to perform her accounting 
duties competently which exposed PFC to liability from third parties. Siddoway 
proffered that Mrs. Barney admitted that she had wrongfully taken the monies and 
judgment was entered against her (Transcript, p. 298). It is also pertinent that Mrs. 
Barney is directly related as the spouse of the Plaintiff/Appellee and her "expert" opinion 
is biased and would violate professional standards concerning conflicts of interest. 
If Mrs. Barney was not properly qualified as an expert, her testimony would be 
inadmissible on the matters about which she testified. For example, as a lay witness, she 
had no foundation to testify about the books and records of STI because she had never 
been an employee or accountant for STI. Her testimony would be inadmissible hearsay. 
Her speculative conjecture would be inadmissible lay opinion testimony. Any other 
testimony that she could offer would have no probative value because she was not witness 
to any agreement between the parties, and could provide no personal knowledge 
testimony about the financial transactions described in her summaries. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it qualified Mrs. Barney as an expert 
witness capable of providing expert accounting testimony in this matter. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING INTO EVIDENCE 
IMPROPER SUMMARIES BY MRS. BARNEY. 
Even if it is determined that Mrs. Barney was qualified to give expert testimony, 
her opinions and conclusions are based on conjecture and speculation. 
A. Mrs. Barney's Summaries Were Shown to Consist of Improper 
Opinion, Speculation and Conjecture. 
Where an "expert'1 testifies that his or her opinion is based upon speculation, it is 
proper to strike the expert's opinion from the record. Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 
339, 347 (Utah 1996). The general rule regarding the certainty of an expert's opinion is 
that the expert may not give an opinion which represents a mere guess, speculation, or 
conjecture. State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 231 (Utah 1980). See also 2 Jones on 
Evidence, s 14:29 (6th ed. 1972). 
Siddoway objected to the speculative nature of Mrs. Barney's testimony and 
summaries but was overruled each time. (Transcript, pp. 304, 307, 321, 323-324, 352, 
361-365). Wilson v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 23 P.2d 921 presents a scenario very 
similar to the instant case. In Wilson, the Supreme Court held that in an action to rescind 
the exchange of notes and mortgage for stock in a securities company, permitting the state 
auditor, who qualified as an expert accountant, to express an opinion as to the financial 
condition of securities company was error, where the auditor knew nothing about the 
company except what was shown by its books and there was no basis in fact for the 
deductions and calculations made by the auditor. The court stated: 
"And in no event was it proper for [the auditor] to express an 
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opinion as to [the solvency of the company] until the facts 
upon which his opinion was founded were before the court so 
that the court might determine whether the alleged facts upon 
which the conclusion was based were real, and also whether 
the facts, if found to be true, justified the conclusion or 
opinion expressed." Id at 925. 
In the present case, before effective cross-examination was terminated by the trial 
court, it was revealed that much of Ms. Barney's testimony and the summaries she 
prepared was based on pure speculation and guesswork. For example, see the statements 
of fact contained in paragraphs 35 through 41, above. During cross-examination Mrs. 
Bamey admitted that her conclusion that Siddoway had wrongfully received excess 
compensation and benefits was based on speculation. Exhibit 14 includes a column 
entitled "comments" which purports to show supporting documentation for how Mrs. 
Bamey reached the conclusion that each check identified in the exhibit constituted an 
excessive and improper benefit to Siddoway. However, in many instances, Mrs. Bamey 
simply states "no documentation" in the "comment" column. When no documentation 
existed to show whether a benefit received by Siddoway was proper or not, she simply 
speculated that it was an improper. The following testimony highlights this problem. 
Q. Now let's look at the next check, 3288 to Price 
Savers. You say there's no documentation there. 
A. Right. 
Q. What caused you to conclude that was a benefit 
that someone took in property from the corporation? 
A. I don't have anyway of knowing if that's what it 
was because there's absolutely no documentation to back it 
up. 
(Transcript, p. 340) 
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Mrs. Barney also testified that speculation was necessary as to many of the items 
listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 14: 
Q. So, you can offer no opinion as to what the 
specific use of the check was where there is a statement that 
says no documentation? 
A. That's correct. I can offer an opinion, but I 
can't offer proof. 
Q. You'd be speculating, wouldn't you? 
A. Pardon. 
Q. You'd be speculating? 
A. Yes. 
(Transcript, p. 241). 
Because Mrs. Barney admitted that Exhibit 14 and her testimony was based on 
mere speculation, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to admit the exhibit and 
her testimony on this issue. 
B. Exhibit 14 and Other "Summaries" Do Not Satisfy the Requirements 
of Rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, and the Trial Court Erred in 
Admitting Such Exhibits as Summaries. 
In addition to the evidentiary defects inherent in speculation and conjecture, 
Exhibit 14 is rendered inadmissible because it is not a summary, as contemplated and 
required by the Rules of Evidence. Rule Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006 provides as 
follows: 
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or 
photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court 
may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or 
calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made 
available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties 
at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they 
be produced in court. 
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Exhibit 14 cannot be considered admissible as a summary since it does not present 
in the form of a chart, summary or calculation the contents of voluminous writings, 
recordings, or photographs which cannot be conveniently examined by the judge in court. 
To the contrary, the exhibit does not even attempt to summarize voluminous writings. It 
merely contains a list of identified checks or charge transactions, selected by Mrs. Barney 
from records she reviewed. Such a selective list is not a summary. In fact it is the 
product of a deliberate effort to produce only a portion of the records and writings of the 
party. The problem can best be seen in the following testimony: 
Q. And this summary [Exhibit 14] does not 
summarize, does it, every single check that was ever written 
from 1990 to 1996, does it? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, correct me if I'm wrong, what you've 
tried to do here is simply pull out things that looked like they 
were personal expenses of Mr. Siddoway, correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that's what you've done. 
(Transcript, p. 302). 
Mrs. Barney testified that she did not review all the checks available in Standard 
Tile financial records in compiling her summary and that in preparing her summary of 
excess personal benefits to Siddoway, she only looked at things which looked like they 
were personal expenses of Siddoway.. (Transcript, pp. 302, 328). Mrs. Barney testified 
that account 290 was a payable account, meaning that it was a liability to the company-a 
debt that the company must pay to Siddoway. She stated that there were many entries 
going back and forth, both debit and credit entries which became a little confusing. 
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(Transcript, p. 315) and there were many more journal entries than what she included in 
her summary. (Transcript, p. 316). 
Mrs. Barney also testified that she had looked for all checks that were paid for 
either partner, (Transcript, p. 342), and that she made a summary of Barney's notes 
payable and receivable from Standard Tile but did not include that summary in the Court 
summary. (Transcript, p. 342). She testified that she did not list checks in her summary 
which indicated a benefit to Barney.(Transcript, p. 342). This kind of selective inclusion 
or exclusion of information flies in the face of Rule 1006. Moreover, the very nature of 
the "summaries" offered by Mrs. Barney violate the Rule by pretending to summarize 
voluminous documents not put into evidence when many documents contained in the 
records of the company were ignored and purposely excluded, thus misleading the court 
into assuming that the "summary" is complete. 
The other exhibits offered by Mrs. Barney as "summaries" are similarly 
inadmissible for the foregoing and other reasons. Plaintiffs Exhibit 15 is Mrs. Barney's 
summary of the value of STI's assets at the time of dissolution. On cross examination, it 
was demonstrated that Mrs. Barney was not qualified to value the assets, did not have 
adequate facts upon which to base her conclusions and relied on her husband for 
estimated values even though she was the only witness offered by Barney for the purpose 
of valuing STI assets. Mrs. Barney did not know the year, make or model of the fax 
machine she valued (Transcript, pp. 365-367) and she relied on her husband to determine 
the value of a grout pump (Transcript, pp. 367-368). Further, no foundation was laid by 
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Bamey to establish that Mrs. Bamey was qualified to value the assets. Despite 
Siddoway's objections that Mrs. Bamey was not qualified to value the assets and her 
estimates were not based on fact (Transcript, pp. 369-370), the trial court admitted her 
testimony and Exhibit 15. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 16, is a summary of closing documents on properties owned by 
STI which Bamey alleges shows excess income Siddoway took as a result of the property 
sales. (Transcript, pp. 373-374). Here again, on cross-examination, it was shown that 
Mrs. Barney's conclusion in this regard had no basis in fact and was merely speculation. 
Regarding Lot 211 Hearthstone, Mrs. Bamey did not know: why the amount stated 
belonged to Standard Tile and was improperly taken by Siddoway (Transcript, pp. 374-
375); how much STI paid for the lot; when STI sold the lot; the nature of the transaction 
whereby STI sold the property; how much Siddoway paid for the property; whether 
Siddoway paid STI for the property; nor whether the money that went into the 
construction of the house on the property was paid for by Siddoway or STL (Transcript, 
p. 375-377). Despite Mrs. Barney's total lack of knowledge concerning the underlying 
facts surrounding the disposition of these properties, she concludes that the income 
generated by these sales was improperly retained by Siddoway. Even more incredible is 
that the trial court admitted Mrs. Barney's testimony and Exhibit 16 and apparently relied 
on it to conclude that Siddoway had improperly retained the income from the sale of these 
properties. As a result, the trial court awarded Bamey $27,598.57 as his 25% interest in 
these properties. (Trial Court Finding Nos. 24 and 25) The trial court's reliance on Mrs. 
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Barney's testimony and summary, which was clearly speculative and lacked foundation, 
was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to Siddoway. 
The trial court found that STI purchased an automobile which was used 
exclusively by Siddoway and his wife. (Finding No. 31). Relying on Mrs. Barney's 
testimony and her summary which is Plaintiffs Exhibit 19, the court found that STI had 
made payments on the car from 1994 to 1996 in the amount of $12,402.20 then awarded 
Barney 50% of this amount which is $6,201.10. This finding and the trial court's reliance 
on Mrs. Barney's testimony and Exhibit 19 was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial to 
Siddoway because it was shown on cross examination that Mrs. Barney unaware that the 
car was used by Mrs. Siddoway on STI business and therefore, a proper business expense. 
(Transcript, pp. 390-391). 
Because Mrs. Barney was not qualified to offer expert accounting and valuation 
testimony in this case, and the testimony she did offer was speculative, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to admit her testimony and summaries. Accordingly, the trial 
court's findings which relied on this "evidence" must be reversed. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting and Then Relying upon 
Inadmissible Evidence in Mrs. Barney's Summaries. 
"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question of law and we always 
review questions of law under a correctness standard." State v. Ramirez 817 P.2d 774, 
782 (FN3) (Utah 1991). 
For the summaries to be admissible, they must qualify both as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, governing the admission of 
business entries, and as a proper summary under Utah Rule of Evidence 1006. Shurtleff 
at 1174; Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Utah R. Evid. 1006 renders summaries inadmissible where they are not made in 
the ordinary coarse of business but in anticipation of litigation. Id. Siddoway objected to 
each of Barney's Exhibits 14 through 23 as inadmissible summaries but was overruled by 
the trial court. (Transcript, pp. 304, 306-307, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 321, 324, 361-365, 
370,). 
The trial court committed reversible error when it relied on Exhibit 14 in its 
findings 18, 19, 30 and 32. This Exhibit is inadmissable under both Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803(6) and 1006. Mrs. Barney's summaries were all offered as summaries of 
the financial records of STI (Transcript, pp.305-22.) The summaries were prepared 
shortly before trial, not in the regular coarse of business of STI and therefore inadmissible 
hearsay under Utah Rule of Evidence 803 and the trial court erred in admitting them into 
evidence and relying on them in its findings. 
Further, only Exhibit 14, which listed numerous checks spanning several years, 
can arguably be characterized as a summary of voluminous writings which could not be 
conveniently examined by the trial court. Mrs. Barney admitted that there were only a 
couple pages of closing documents summarized in Exhibit 16. (Transcript, p. 373) 
These exhibits are not even true summaries of STFs business records because they 
include opinions and conclusions reached by Mrs. Barney. (Exhibit 14 contains a 
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comment column) Mrs. Barney also testified that she only included those checks on 
Exhibit 14 which arguably showed an improper benefit to Siddoway. She excluded any 
checks which may have demonstrated benefits received by Barney. (Transcript, pp. 328-
329) Exhibit 15 includes her opinion as to the present value of the equipment that STI 
owned at its dissolution. The record clearly indicates that the trial court erred in admitting 
Mrs. Barney's summaries. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ACCEPTANCE OF INADMISSIBLE AND 
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE AND SUBSEQUENT INTERFERENCE WITH 
APPELLANT'S EXAMINATION ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
CONSTITUTED A CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH PREVENTED FAIR 
ADJUDICATION. 
Where the cumulative effect of multiple errors by the trial court prevents a party 
from receiving a fair trial, the case should be reversed, and if necessary, remanded for a 
new trial. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). 
In Whitehead, the court found that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence offered 
by defendants which was necessary to rebut the assertions that plaintiffs made to establish 
liability. The error was compounded by unduly restricting the scope of defendants' cross-
examination. As a result, the court in Whitehead could not say that substantial rights of 
the defendants were not affected and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. 
Similarly, in this case, the trial court committed a series of errors with regard to 
Mrs. Barney and her testimony, that when taken together, denied Siddoway the 
opportunity to a fairly rebut that testimony. First, Siddoway made a pre-trial motion to 
exclude Mrs. Barney's summaries because they were disclosed until after discovery in the 
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case was closed and Mrs. Barney's deposition had been taken. (Transcript, p. 4.) 
Siddoway had no opportunity to examine Mrs. Barney regarding the summaries or to 
conduct any discovery based upon the summaries. They were not produced to Siddoway 
until approximately ten days before trial (Transcript, p. 7.) and therefore the trial court 
severely prejudiced Siddoway by allowing these summaries (which are entirely hearsay) 
to come into evidence. 
Second, the trial court compounded its error when it unduly limited Siddoway's 
opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Barney (who had been improperly qualified as an 
expert witness) on the details of her summaries. Because the trial court had qualified her 
as an expert witness, Siddoway should have been granted even more leeway in the scope 
of the cross-examination than might be allowed with a factual witness: 
"Having offered his expert opinion, the witness exposes himself to 
interrogation which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-
examination of a factual witness, but the expert exposes himself to the most 
searching kind of investigation into his qualifications, the extent of his 
knowledge and the reasons for his opinion, including facts and other matters 
upon which it is based." 
Whitehead at 924, citing Chrysler Corp., v. Todorivich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1133 (Wyo. 
1978). Siddoway's counsel expressed his intention to review each individual entry on 
Mrs. Barney's summaries to determine the basis for her conclusion that the listed benefits 
and compensation were improper. (Transcript, pp. 347-348). The court responded on 
several occasions that instead of trying to impeach Mrs. Barney, counsel should simply 
rebut her testimony through testimony from Siddoway or Mr. Okuda. (Transcript, pp. 
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348, 352, 360, and 365). Therefore, the limitations imposed by the trial court on 
Siddoway's cross-examination of Mrs. Barney were an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion inasmuch as they substantially prejudiced Siddoway. 
Third, in addition to limiting Siddoway's cross-examination of Mrs. Barney, and in 
spite of its earlier statements that it would allow Siddoway to rebut Mrs. Barney's 
testimony, the trial court would not allow Mr. Okuda to rebut the specific findings of Mrs. 
Barney in her summaries. (Transcript, pp. 446-447). The trial court made it clear that it 
did not want to hear a detailed examination of the records noted in Mrs. Barney's 
summaries. (Transcript, pp. 449-452). In short, the trial court put Siddoway in the 
untenable position of not being able to thoroughly cross-examine Mrs. Barney on her 
findings and conclusions, and not being able to rebut her testimony by offering testimony 
of the corporation accountant—the individual in the best position to explain financial 
records and whether excessive benefits were taken by either party. 
Fourth, the trial court precluded Siddoway from rebutting Mrs. Barney's testimony 
and the information set forth in Exhibit 14 through his own testimony as to the purpose 
and justification behind each transaction. (Transcript, pp. 456-458.) Mr. Siddoway was 
prepared to explain each transaction described in Exhibit 14 and prove either the 
legitimate business purpose for each, or that it was properly accounted for as an advance 
to Siddoway which was subsequently reimbursed to STL (Id.) However, as the record 
indicates, the trial court interrupted the proceedings to again state its decision with regard 
to Siddoway's excess benefits and Barney's shares of stock. (Transcript pp. 457-460.) 
37 
When Siddoway's attorney acknowledged the court's intent to avoid review of the 
contents of Exhibit 14, (again noting his intention to put Siddoway on the stand to explain 
those transactions) the court confirmed to both attorneys that he would not consider 
examination of the transactions on Exhibit 14 and directed Siddoway's attorney to pursue 
other testimony. (Transcript, pp. 460-461). 
Finally, as he was directing counsel to stay away from the contents of Exhibit 14, 
the trial court announced its intent to find a 25% stock ownership in Barney, based upon 
the excess compensation and benefits alleged in Mrs. Barney's summaries. (Transcript, 
pp. 457-458; 462, lines 12-22.) 
Each of the forgoing errors-by themselves-justifies reversal of the trial court's 
finding that Barney owned 25% of STL However, even if this Court determines 
otherwise, the cumulative effect of the trial court's multiple errors is sufficient for this 
Court to conclude that Siddoway was denied the opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence 
contained in Mrs. Barney's summaries-which the trial court eventually declared was the 
basis for augmenting Barney's percentage of ownership in STL (Transcript, p. 457.) 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erroneously concluded that Mr. Barney is entitled to 25% of the 
ownership of STI, and further erred in applying that percentage to the assets of the 
corporation in awarding Mr. Barney a judgment in the amount of $41,036.17. The 
judgment also erroneously includes 50% of a note receivable from Mr. Siddoway, which 
should correctly have been treated as an asset of the corporation. The court should have 
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distributed 14.5% of the same to Mr. Barney. 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reform the judgment to award a 
14.5% ownership interest in the assets of STI to Mr. Barney and award him judgment in 
the amount of $25,584.66. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand this matter for recalculation of damages based upon a 14.5% 
ownership of STI by Mr. Barney. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEE O. BARNEY, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
JON D. SIDDOWAY and STANDARD ) 
TELE, INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Case No. 960905245CN 
• Judge David S. Young 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED matter came on for trial before the honorable David S. Young, 
District Court Judge, commencing Wednesday February 17, 1999, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The trial 
lasted for three (3) days, February 17, 18, 'and 19. The Plaintiff, Lee O. Barney, was represented by 
his counsel, Larry A. Kirkham, of the firm of Larson, Kirkham & Turner, L.C. The Plaintiff was 
present personally during the course of this trial. The Defendant Jon D. Siddoway and Defendant 
Standard Tile, Inc. were represented by Evan A. Schmutz of the firm of Hill, Harrison, Johnson & 
Schmutz. Defendant, Jon D. Siddoway, was present personally during the three (3) days of trial. 
The Court took die testimony of the witnesses including the parties as well as received 
documentary evidence during the course of the trial. At the close of trial, on Friday, February 19, 
Th5flwa,iSTa,C7 COURT 
Third Judicial District 
1999, the Court rendered its' opinion. The Plaintiff by and through counsel prepared proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as an Order and Judgment which was objected to by 
the Defendant The Plaintiff also filed a motion for an appointment of a receiver and a Memorandum 
of Costs. The Defendant filed a Motion to Tax Costs. The Motion to Tax Costs, Motion for an 
Appointment of a Receiver, and the objections regarding Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
the Order and Judgment were heard by the Court on Tuesday May 18, 1999, commencing at the hour 
of 8:30 a.m. The Court made rulings with respect to the motions, objections to the Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law, and accordingly makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
FTNDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Lee 0. Barney, hereafter referred to as Barney, and Defendant, Jon D. 
Siddoway, hereafter referred to as Siddoway, are individuals and residents of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Standard Tile, Inc., hereafter STI, is a Utah corporation with its' principal 
place of business is in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The corporation, STI, was organized in 1986, by Siddoway, and Siddoway owned 100 
percent of the stock of the corporation from 1986,.up to and including 1989. 
4. In or about the first part of March of 1989, Barney was approached by Siddoway for 
the purpose of becoming a shareholder in STI and also becoming a partner with Siddoway in all future 
business endeavors. 
? 
3. The parties reached a verbal agreement sometime prior to March 31, 1989, regarding 
Barney's participation in the corporation, STL 
6 The terms of the agreement reached by the parties in 1989, and which was to become 
effective April 1, 1989, was as follows: 
a. Barney would become an employee of STI just as Siddoway was an employee oi 
STI. 
l-i Barney would have the right and/or opportunity to purchase up to a total of 25 
percent of the stock in STI from bonuses as more particularly set forth below. 
c. Barney and Siddoway agreed that both parties would receive the same monthly 
base salary commencing April 1, 1989, and continuing thereafter. 
d. The parties agreed that each party would receive the use and benefit of a 
company vehicle commencing April 1, 1989, and thereafter. 
e. The parties agreed that any profits from the corporation or operation of the 
business would be split or divided on the basis of Siddoway receiving 75 percent of the profits and 
Barney receiving 25 percent of the profits commencing April 1, 1989, and thereafter. 
7. At all times relevant hereto, Siddoway controlled all of the financial aspects including the 
checking account, etc. of STI. At no time did Barney have the right to sign any checks on the 
corporation checking account or withdraw funds from the corporate account. 
8. The corporate books and records including shares of stock, stock register, minutes of 
meetings, etc., were lost by the company accountant in either 1993, or 1994. 
9. Following the loss of the corporate records, no minutes were kept of any meetings 
thereafter. No notices of meetings or waiver of notice for any meeting was prepared after the original 
books and records were lost. 
10. No corporate resolutions were ever prepared after the records were lost. 
11. The Court finds that in 1989, Siddoway represented to Barney that the value of the 
corporation was $100,000.00 and Barney would therefore be required to pay into the corporation 
$25,000.00 in order to purchase 25 percent of the stock in STL 
12. The parties had a falling out in February of 1996, and Barney no longer worked for the 
STI after the end of February, 1996. 
13. The corporation STI had certain assets in February of 1996, as did the partnership S&B 
Storage. 
14. Based on the representation of Siddoway, Barney agreed to pay up to $25,000.00 for a 25 
percent interest in STI, or $ 1,000.00 per percentage point of stock ownership in STI. 
15. Barney paid $14,500.00 out of his bonuses toward purchase of stock at the following 
times in the following amounts: 
Date of Purchase Amount 
November 30, 1990 1,500.00 
December 31,1990 7,000.00 
December 31, 1994 6,000.00 
Total: 14,500,00 
16. In 1996, Barney was allocated a net bonus of $5,370.00 that was never paid and should 
be applied toward the stock purchase bringing the total stock purchase amount to $19,870.00 or a total of 
19.87 percent of the stock. 
17. The remaining balance owing for the stock purchase ,by Barney, would have been 
$5,130.00. 
18. Siddoway took benefits and paid personal obligations from corporate funds in which 
Barney was entitled to share. 
19. Barney's share of the excess benefits taken by Siddoway far exceeds the $5,130.00 and 
therefore, Bamey has paid well in excess of $25,000.00 for his 25 percent interest in the corporation STI 
and is therefore a 25 percent shareholder in STI. 
20. The corporation was effectively dissolved as of the end of February of 1996, when the 
parties no longer worked together and when Barney's employment with STI was terminated. 
21. From the evidence presented, Bamey and Siddoway were the only shareholders of STI. 
22. At the time the parties terminated their business relationship, the corporation owned 
certain assets, most of which were taken by Siddoway. 
23. The account receivables, as of termination, were collected and used to pay debts and 
obligations of STI and accordingly no judgment should be entered in favor of Bamey and against 
Siddoway in this regard. 
24. The corporation, STI, had the following assets or interest in real property as of the date 
the parties terminated and the assets and values are as follows: 
a. Lot 202 Hearthstone Estates, net equity $63,545.76; 
b. Lot 202 Hearthstone Estates, deposits $7,800.00; 
c. Lot 211 Hearthstone Estates, purchase price $38,548.50; 
& Lot 423 Hearthstone Estates, deposit $500.00; 
e. For a total of $110,549.26. 
25. These assets were taken by Siddoway and therefore Barney is entitled to a judgment 
against Siddoway personally for 25 percent of the value of these assets or $27,598.57. 
26. The corporation owned equipment, vehicles, and furnishings at the time the parties 
separated. 
27. The Court finds that the total value of the equipment, vehicles, and furnishings is 
$44,666.67. 
28. Siddoway has taken or received $33,500.00 in value of the equipment and Barney has 
taken or received $10,438.00 in value of the equipment consistent with Exhibits 15 and 29 offered in 
evidence. 
29. Barney is entitled to a judgment against Siddoway for $728.68 representing the excess of 
the equipment received by Siddoway up and above that which was received by Barney. 
30. Barney obtained a 25 percent ownership in STI tiirough his bonuses as well as additional 
excess benefits taken and received by Siddoway to pay personal expenses which were not shared with 
Barney in accordance with the agreement of the parties. 
31. STI also purchased a Lincoln Continental Automobile which was used exclusively by 
Siddoway and Siddoway's wife. The payments on die automobile, for the period of two (2) years from 
1994, through 1996, totaled $12,402.20, and Barney is entitled to a judgment against Siddoway for an 
amount equal to 50 percent of that amount or $6,201.10. This amount is derived from Barney's Exhibit 
19. 
32. In February of 1996, Siddoway owed, to STI, the sum of $13,415.63, which were 
additional funds taken by Siddoway. Barney is entitled to 50 percent of that amount or a judgment 
against Siddoway in the amount of $6,707.82. 
33. Barney made a further request for an award and judgment against Siddoway for excess 
life insurance benefits received by Siddoway. After review of the evidence, however, the Court finds 
that the benefits received by Barney regarding life insurance on his life as well as the benefits Siddoway 
received regarding life insurance on his life are consistent with the parties' agreement and therefore no 
judgment should be awarded to Barney relative to life insurance benefits. 
34. Barney's total judgment against Siddoway as it relates to Barney's interest in STI is 
$41,036.17. 
35. In 1992, the parties entered into a second business arrangement, a partnership, known as 
S&B Storage. 
36. The major asset of the partnership is real property located at 4754 Riverside Drive. This 
real property consists of land and a building consisting of storage units. This property is located in Salt 
Lake County and legally described as follows: 
21-01-355-008 
COM 643.74FT. N & 1442.83FT W & S 13° W 406.44FT FR S 3 COR SEC 1 T 2S 
Rl W SL MERN 86°45T W 409.88FT TO E BANK OF JORDAN RIVER CHANNEL S 
21 °10' E 128.3FT S 86°45' E 336.28FTTO WLINE RIVERSIDE DRIVE N 13° 14' E 
118.62FTTOBEG1.G6AC 
37. The parties, Barney and Siddoway or the partnership S&B Storage, purchased the real 
property for a total purchase price of $326,000.00. 
38. The down payment on the property was $40,000.00 of which Barney contributed 
$10,416.14 from his 1991, bonus from STI. Siddoway contributed $33,008.58 from his 1991, bonus 
from STI. This finding is consistent with the evidence presented in Exhibits 1,2, and 3. 
39. A trust deed note on the property was taken back in favor of William and Shirley Baker 
in the amount of $286,000.00. 
40. All of the monthly payments under the trust deed note in the amount of $3,157.02 per 
month were paid from the income from S&B Storage. 
41. The title to the real property was taken in the name of Jon D. Siddoway and Dawn 
Siddoway but nonetheless constitutes property of and an asset of the partnership S&B Storage since the 
property was acquired with partnership funds and paid for exclusively with partnership funds. 
42. S&B Storage, as a partnership, should be dissolved consistent with Utah General 
Partnership Law and the assets liquidated. 
43. The Court indicated at the end of the trial and again on May 18, 1999, that the parties 
should try and work something out with regard to the assets of S&B Storage partnership including a 
determination of equity in the real property. The Court finds that unless the parties have reached a 
settlement with respect to S&B Storage and division of the equity in the property and assets of S&B 
Storage, a receiver will be appointed by June 14, 1999, to take over the management and operation of 
S&B Storage. 
44. If necessary , the Court will hold a further evidentiary hearing regarding the value of the 
S&B Property, determination of the net equity therein, and will consider entering judgment for the 
value. 45. The parties have a dispute with regard to the net income generated by S&B Storage for 
the years 1996, 1997, and 1998. The parties are instructed to contact Mr. Okuda to determine that net 
income and Barney's share thereof. 
46. Siddoway must also account, to Barney, for the income and expenses for the months of 
January and February of 1999, and any subsequent months thereafter. 
47. At or near the end of the hearing on May 18,1999, Plaintiff and Defendant by and 
through their respective counsel, stipulated and agreed that Siddoway would pay to Barney the sum of 
$81,000.00 in compromise and full settlement of Barney's equity in the real property and other assets of 
S&B Storage and all claims and defenses arising in connection therewith except that Siddoway reserved 
the right, if necessary, to present further evidence to the Court on Siddoway's entitlement to be 
reimbursed by Barney for management fees and unpaid expenses in connection with his management 
of the real property of S&B Storage since the formation of the partnership. 
48. Siddoway's attorney represented that the amount of $81,000.00 was contained in his trust 
account and payment of that amount could be made immediately to Barney. 
49. The parties also argued the Motion to Tax Costs and accordingly the Court finds that 
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for costs in the amount of $1,654.00 which includes filing fees, costs 
of service of the original Complaint and Summons, deposition costs for the deposition of Jon Siddoway 
and Tubber Okuda, and witness fees and costs of service for witnesses subpoenaed to testify at trial. 
o 
50. The remainder of Plaintiffs requests for costs and as set forth in the Memorandum of 
Costs is denied. 
51. The Court finds there is no basis to award attorney fees and therefore each party should 
bear their own attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters its' Conclusion of Law 
as follows: 
1. At the time of the parties separation in 1996, Bamey was a 25 percent owner in the 
corporation STI and Siddoway was 75 percent owner in the corporation STL 
2. S&B Storage is a partnership within the definition and under the Uniform Partnership Act 
in Utah. 
3. The partnership S&B Storage owned the real property located at 4754 Riverside Drive 
even though title to real property was originally taken in the name of Jon D. Siddoway and Dawn 
Siddoway. 
4. As set forth above, Plaintiff is entitled to costs consistent with Rule 54 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the amount set forth above. 
5. Siddoway as the majority shareholder in STI and as the managing partner of S&B 
Storage, owed a fiduciary duty, and duty to account to Bamey and therefore Bamey is entitled to a 
judgment against Siddoway. 
6. To the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact or any of them constitute a Conclusion of 
10 
Law, the same are incorporated herein and by this reference made a part hereof as additional 
Conclusions of Law. 
7. Each party should be ordered to execute such documents as may be necessary to 
implement the terms of the judgment and order of the Court. 
DATED this 7^Hay of x X ^ , ^ , , 1999. 
By the Court: 
David S. Young ' 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Qfejcm 
A. Schmutz 
Attorney for Defendant 
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'ft£Bi'*FMCT C0URT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 7 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clark" 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEE O. BARNEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON D. SIDDOWAY and STANDARD 
TILE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960905245CN 
Judge David S. Young 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED matter came on for trial before the honorable David S. Young, 
District Court Judge, commencing Wednesday February 17, 1999, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. The trial 
lasted for three (3) days, February 17, 18, and 19. The Plaintiff, Lee O. Barney, hereafter referred to 
as Barney, was present personally and was represented by his counsel, Larry A. Kirkham, of the firm 
of Larson, Kirkham & Turner, L.C. The Plaintiff was present personally during the course of this 
trial. The Defendant Jon D. Siddoway and Defendant Standard Tile, Inc. were represented by Evan 
A. Schmutz of the firm of Hill, Harrison, Johnson & Schmutz. Defendant, Jon D. Siddoway, 
hereafter referred to as Siddoway, was present personally during the three (3) days of trial. 
The Court took the testimony of the witnesses including the parties as well as received 
documentary evidence during the course of the trial. A Verified Memorandum of Costs and a Motion 
to Tax Costs as well as a Motion for Appointment of a Receiver and Objection to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was held on May 18, 1999. The Court made rulings with respect to those 
motions and objections and accordingly entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based on 
those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed: 
1. Siddoway's Pre-trial Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
2. Siddoway's Pre-trial Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
3. Siddoway's Motion to Dismiss at the close of Plaintiffs case is denied. 
4. Siddoway's Motion In Limine is denied. 
5. Barney's Motion to Amend Complaint is denied. 
6. Barney's Motion for Appointment of a Receiver is granted and unless the parties reach 
a settlement with regard to division of assets and equity in S&B Storage, a receiver will be appointed 
on June 14, 1999. 
7. Siddoway's Motion to Tax Costs is granted in part and denied in part and Barney is 
awarded a judgment against Siddoway in the amount of $1,654.55 representing recoverable costs. 
8. The corporation Standard Tile, Inc., hereafter referred to as STI, is hereby dissolved 
and was in effect dissolved in 1996. 
9. Barney is hereby granted judgment against Siddoway individually in the amount of 
$41,036.17 representing Barney's share of assets in the corporation STI which were taken by 
Siddoway and which should have been paid to Barney. 
10. The parties are instructed to talk to Mr. Okuda, the company accountant for S&B 
Storage, to determine the net income for the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, as well as net income for 
1999. Barney is entitled to 25 percent of the net income. If the parties cannot arrive at a figure or 
reach an agreement, the Court will entertain a further hearing in that regard. 
11. Siddoway is ordered to pay to Barney the sum of $81,000.00 representing the 
compromise figure dealing with the assets and equity of the property belonging to S&B Storage. 
12. Siddoway is granted the right and hereby reserves the right to present further evidence 
to the Court and make claim for management fees during the period of time S&B Storage, as a 
partnership, was in place. 
13. No prejudgment interest is awarded to either party and each party shall bear their own 
costs and attorney fees. 
14. The entire judgment as set forth herein including judgment for costs shall bear interest 
at the judgment rate allowed by statute. The current judgment rate is 6.153 percent. 
15. Both parties are ordered to execute any and all necessary documents to carry out the 
terms of this order and judgment and are ordered to cooperate with each other in resolving the 
undisputed issues. 
DATED this / day of JtfftjL , 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
By the Court: 
David S/ Young 
District Court Judge 
: A. Schmutz 
Attorney for Defendant 
EXHIBIT C 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 14 
"Summary of excess benefits taken by Siddoway from Standard Tile" 
SUMMARY OF EXCESS BENEFITS 



































































First Capitol Life 
New York Life 


















Allied Clinical Lab 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Alta View Hospital 
Pediatric Asso. 







































































Purchase Motor home 
No documentation 
Siddoway Personal 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation / No Purpose 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Siddoway Personal / No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Siddoway purchases 
Siddoway Medical / Personal 
Siddoway Medical / Personal 
Siddoway Medical / Personal 
Siddoway Personal / Personal 
Siddoway Disability 
Siddoway Personal 













































2976 Zions Bank 
2787 D. Adamson 
2951 T&LCafe 




























































































S136.75 Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
S107.59 No documentation 
$55.17 Zions MasterCard / No documentation 































Zions MasterCard / 
Zions MasterCard / 
Zions MasterCard / 
Zions MasterCard / 
Zions MasterCard / 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / 









Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Siddoway Personal Travel / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Legal / No documentation 





















Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
































Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
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3864 New York Life 
















































3757 First Capitol Life 
3765 CSE Insurance Group 





































































Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Siddoway disability 
No documentation / Siddoway Personal 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Visa Gold 
Visa Gold 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 




Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 







Date CK# Payee Acct Amount Comments 
09/01/91 3754 Discover Card 665 
09/27/91 3797 Zions Bank 665 
12/04/91 3897 Discover 665 
01/05/91 3403 Marine Wholesalers 670 
04/26/91 3561 Zions Bank 670 
05/30/91 3602 Discover Card 670 
10/30/91 3854 Zions Bank 670 
11/07/91 3859 Discover 670 
12/02/91 3961 Plaza Cycle 673 
03/08/91 3491 Zions Bank 674 
06/19/91 3632 JonSiddoway 674 
09/01/91 3759 Zions Bank 674 
09/27/91 3797 Zions Bank 674 
10/04/91 3810 JonSiddoway 674 
10/17/91 3823 Harmons 674 
10/17/91 3845 PACE 674 
11/18/91 3882 JonSiddoway 674 
01/31/91 3435 Zions Bank 683 
08/06/91 3718 Zions Bank 683 
11/17/91 3954 Pagoda Restaurant 683 
11/20/91 3950 ZCMI 683 
11/22/91 3950 Shopko 683 
11/22/91 3950 ZCMI 683 
12/08/91 3950 Fred Meyer 683 
12/09/91 3950 Shopko 683 
12/09/91 3950 Shopko 683 
12/09/91 3950 Shopko 683 
12/10/91 3950 Kmart 683 
01/31/91 3435 Zions Bank 690 
01/31/91 3435 Zions Bank 690 
03/08/91 3491 Zions Bank 690 
03/29/91 3525 Zions Bank 690 
04/26/91 3561 Zions Bank 690 
05/30/91 3604 Zions Bank 690 
07/05/91 3649 Zions Bank 690 
08/06/91 3716 Discover 690 
08/06/91 3718 Zions Bank 690 
09/01/91 3759 Zions Bank 690 
10/30/91 3854 Zions Bank 690 
11/07/91 3862 Discover 690 
12/04/91 3897 Discover 690 
12/04/91 3897 Discover 690 













































Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Siddoway /No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation / Dawn Siddoway 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Visa Gold / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 




Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions M/C 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No 
Zions MasterCard / No 










































































































































































































































Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
Zions MasterCard / No documentation 
No documentation 
No documentation / Check shows "Jons" 
No documentation 
No documentation 





Delivery Address / Siddoway Residence 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Delivery Address/Siddoway Personal Residence 
Trade Credit 
Invoice 536500 - Siddoway 
Trade Credit 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
No documentation 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
No documentation 
Invoice 546604 - Siddoway 
Invoice 54493 I - Siddoway 
Invoice 543662 - signed by D. Siddoway 
Purchase by Dawn Siddoway 
Visa Gold 
Visa Gold 
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Tioga Motor Home 640 
Chevy Corsica 640 
American Concept Insurn 640 
Chevy Corsica 640 






4258 Bringard Co 
637 S203.94 Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
SI59.00 Coverage 05/28/92 -11/28/92 
S273.00 Coverage 05/28/92 - 11/28/92 
$312.00 Total Check Amount 
S312.00 Coverage 11/28/92 - 05/28/93 
690 S10.41 Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
690 S9.96 Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
690 $ 10.96 Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
693 $155.60 Waste Pick Siddoway Residence 
693 S53.13 Waste Pick Siddoway Residence 
693 SI54.00 Waste Pick Siddoway Residence 




























4745 Dees Restaurant 610 $23.10 
4745 TGI Fridays 610 $35.91 
4987 Chili's Restaurant 610 $14.76 
4987 Dees Restaurant 610 $11.76 
4987 Fong Ling Restaurant 610 $100.16 
5070 Olive Garden 610 $49.54 
5070 Mulboons 610 $197.71 
5070 Green Parrot 610 $26.00 
5129 Red Lobster 610 $42.21 
5164 Marine Products Pro 610 $7.00 
5164 Green Street 610 $29.96 
4707 Denim Depot 618 $48.85 
4707 Red Lion 618 $22.75 
4745 Red Lion 618 $41.25 
4796 Greecian Gardens 618 $15.50 
4796 Deer Valley Resort 618 $43.30 
4796 Greecian Gardens 618 S8.20 
4839 Utah Jazz 618 $2,631.60 
4936 Tony Romas 618 $40.22 
5175 JC Penny 634 $505.03 
5175 Mervyns 634 Included in 505.03 
5175 Shopko 634 Included in 505.03 
5175 Shopko 634 Included in 505.03 
5175 Toys R Us 634 Included in 505.03 




















Discover/ Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 
Discover / Dawn Siddoway 

















































































Advanced Home Prescrip 637 
Dr. David Lusty 637 
Holy Cross Jordan Valley 637 
Jordan Valley Fam Health 637 
Chevy Corsica 
Tioga Motor Home 




State Line Casino 
Morris Air 










Supersonic Car Wash 
Bullfrog Resort 
Buffs & Puffs 
Texaco 





Five Alls Restaurant 
Village Inn 
Sizzler 












































































Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Coverage 05/28/93 -11/28/93 
Coverage 05/28/93 - 11/28/93 
Coverage 11/28/93 - 05/28/94 





Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
No documentation 
No documentation 
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La Caille Restaurant 
Million Dollar Saloon 


















































































































































Craig Wilenson MD 
Sun West Cottonwood H 
Cottonwood Hospital 
Anthony Diaz MD 































































































Personal Medical / Siddoway / No Gen Ledger 
Personal Medical / Siddoway / Spa 
Personal Medical / Siddoway / No Gen Ledger 
Personal Medical / Siddoway / No Gen Ledger 
Personal Medical / Siddoway / Spa 
9 












Dr. Rodney Davis 
Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Alta View Hosp 






05/09/94 5317 Tioga Motor Home 640 
05/09/94 5317 Lincoln Town Car 640 
08/17/94 5471 Tioga Motor Home 640 
11/10/94 5595 Lincoln Town Car 640 
12/20/94 5657 Tioga Motor Home 640 
03/23/94 5253 Bowells Plumbing 665 
01/25/94 5256 Delta Air 683 
04/03/94 5323 Delta Air 683 









































Supersonic Car Wash 
Bullfrog Resort 






















08/17/94 5535 Pizza & Pasta 695 






































































Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Coverage 05/28/94 - 11/28/94 
Coverage 05/28/94 - 11/28/94 
Coverage 05/28/94 - 11/28/94 
Coverage 11/28/94 - 05/28/95 
Coverage 11/28/94 - 05/28/95 
No documentation 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
No documentation 
No documentation 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Corsica Repairs 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Tires Corsica 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Personal Travel / Siddoway 
Visa Gold 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Tires Lincoln 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Lincoln- repairs 

























































































































Dr. Rodney Davis 
Salt Lake Family Clinic 
Salt Lake Family Clinic 
Salt Lake Family Clinic 
Lincoln Town Car 
Tioga Motor Home 
Lincoln Town Car 









Lone Star Restaurant 
Bennetts Barbacue 
Chart House Restaurant 
Training Table 
Bennetts Barbacue 
Chart House Restaurant 






































































































Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Personal Medical / Siddoway 
Coverage 05/28/95 - 11/28/95 
Coverage 05/28/95 -11/28/95 
Coverage 11/28/96 - 05/28/96 
Coverage 11/25/95 - 05/28/96 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Lincoln-repairs 
Visa Gold / bathroom scale 
Siddoway Personal Vehicle / Lincoln-repairs 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
































TOTAL ALL YEARS: 
Tioga Motor Home 
Lincoln Town Car 
640 
640 
American Concept Insura 640 
Robert Munson Masonry 













1990 Inerest at 10% (12-31-90 to 02-25-99) 
1991 Inerest at 10% (12-31-91 to 02-25-99) 
1992 Inerest at 10% (12-31-92 to 02-25-99) 
1993 Inerest at 10% (12-31-93 to 02-25-99) 
1994 Inerest at 10% (12-31-94 to 02-25-99) 
1995 Inerest at 10% (12-31-95 to 02-25-99) 
1996 Inerest at 10% (12-31-96 to 02-25-99) 
TOTAL INTEREST: 
TOTAL EXCESS BENEFITS & INTEREST 























Coverage 05/28/96 -11/28/96 
Coverage 05/28/96 - 11/28/96 
Total Check Amount 
Total includes personal vehicles only 
Inv. shows repair at S&B/Why did Standard 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Visa Gold / Dawn Siddoway 
Repairs / Lincoln 
Purchases by Dawn Siddoway 
Motor Home 
Siddoway Boat 
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